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WHEN DOES TIME BEGIN?: A CLARIFICATION
OF THE FEDERAL COURTS' INCONSISTENT
APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL "CATCH-ALL"
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
When does the clock start ticking in a civil penalty assessment
case? When the underlying violation occurs or when the government
agency issues itsfinal penalty assessment? This question represents one
of the many uncertainties resulting from the federal courts' inconsistent
interpretation and application of 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (Section 2462).' Congress enacted Section 2462 to apply to penalty enforcement claims arising under statutes that contain no specific time limitations.2 For decades,
the federal courts have failed to consistently interpret and apply the
"catch all" statute of limitations to civil penalty assessment cases.3 The
ambiguity surrounding Section 2462 creates dilemmas for practitioners
seeking shelter from government agencies wielding open ended civil
penalties.4
In United States v. Core Laboratories,Inc.5 and United States v.
Meyer,' two courts, each applying Section 2462 to the Export Admini'See United States v. Great Am. Veal, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 416, 420 (D.N.J. 1998)
(noting cases applying Section 2462 have been inconsistent in their application); United
States v. McCune, 763 F. Supp. 916, 917 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (recognizing conflict between
First and Fifth Circuits); Edward J. Carroll, Note, Mullikin v. United States: "Big
Brother" is Still Watching; the IRS Can Assess Penalties at Any Time, 16 W. NEW ENG.
L. REV. 181, 182 (1994) (recognizing controversy in application of Section 2462).
2 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1994). The statute provides in pertinent part: "except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of
any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained
unless commenced within five years from the date when the claim first accrued..." Id.
3 See Carroll, supra note 1, at 182 and accompanying text (acknowledging inconsistent application of Section 2462).
See id at 184 (recognizing controversy in application of Section 2462); Teresa A.
Holderer, Note, Enforcement of the TSCA and the FederalFive Year Statute of Limitations for Penalty Actions, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1025 (1993) (acknowledging ambiguity in Section 2462's interpretation).
' 759 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1985).
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stration Act (EAA), interpreted the accrual date differently.7 The court
in Core Laboratories,Inc. (Core) found the accrual language in Section
2462 requires all agencies to initiate a civil penalty proceeding within
five years of the violation date.8 Conversely, the Meyer court held that
the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the administrative
agency imposes a final civil penalty assessment. 9 Essentially, the Meyer
after its final civil penalty
court gives an agency an additional five years
0
assessment to bring an enforcement action.'
The conflicting interpretations of Section 2462 are not limited to2
1
the Core and Meyer decisions.' The court in United States v. Graham
found the five year statute of limitations begins to run on the date the
notice of violation or cessation orders were issued.1 3 The court in Atlantic States Legal Found. v. AL Tech Specialty Steel Corp."1 held that
where an administrative proceeding is a prerequisite to a judicial action,
the Section 2462 limitation period is tolled for the duration of the administrative proceeding.S
6 808 F.2d 912 (1st Cir. 1987).
7 See

id. at 921 (finding Section 2462's accrual date to be date government issued
final administrative assessment). But see Core Lab., Inc., 759 F.2d at 483 (interpreting
Section 2462 as requiring date of underlying violations as accrual date).
a See Core Lab., Inc., 759 F.2d at 481.
9 See Meyer, 808 F.2d at 915.
'0See id. at 921 (finding enforcement action claims do not accrue until after mandatory administrative proceedings conclude).
n See e.g., 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1457-61 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (applying
Section 2462 to civil penalty assessment proceedings and finding violation date as accrual date); Federal Election Comm'n v. National Republican Senatorial Comm. 877 F.
Supp. 15, 19 (D.D.C. 1995) (concluding statute of limitations tolled during administrative assessment proceedings because they are not enforcement actions); United States v.
Lueking, 125 BR. 513, 514 (E.D. Tenn. 1990) (finding, where administrative proceedings are prerequisite, Section 2462 runs upon issuance of notice of violation).
12 No. 87-1843, 1989 WL 248111, *2 (W.D.Pa). July 20, 1989).
'sSee id. (reasoning notice of violation triggers statute of limitations because penalty proceedings are within government's control); Lueking, 125 B.R., at 514 (finding
statute of limitations begins to run upon issuance of notice of violations).
14 635 F. Supp. 284 (N.D.
N.Y. 1986).
's See id. at 288 (ruling by sending notice letter of violation, statute of limitations
is tolled for sixty days). The court followed the line of reasoning that, "if prior resort to
an administrative body is a prerequisite to judicial review, the running of the statute of
limitations period should be tolled during the administrative proceeding." Id. See also
Federal Election Comm'n v. National Republican Senatorial Comm., 877 F. Supp. 15, 20
(D.D.C. 1995) (finding Section 2462 is tolled only when administrative proceedings
contain basic elements of adversarial adjudication).
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The federal courts' inconsistent interpretations of Section 2462
creates unpredictability and bewilderment for private parties defending
penalty assessment claims.1 6 Part I of this article explains the ambiguity
in the federal courts' interpretation of Section 2462.17 Part II reviews the
general legislative intent regarding statutes of limitations, exceptions to
the general rule that statutes of limitations do not run against the government, and the legislative history of Section 2462.18 Part III proposes a
hypothetical civil penalty fact pattern to further illustrate the complexities of certain civil penalty cases.' 9 Part IV addresses the problems included in the hypothetical and proposes a resolution based upon a consideration of the analysis used in three major decisions applying Section
2462 to civil penalty assessment claims. 20 Part V proposes an analytical
framework based on legislative intent, the language of Section 2462 and
recent application by the federal courts. 2' This framework will, in the
absence of a clear definition of the statute's scope and its application,
provide guidance for a suggested application of Section 2462.22 Part IV
concludes by suggesting that the inconsistent application of a statute for
nearly four decades necessitates that the Supreme Court define23 the scope
and application of the federal "catch all" statute of limitations.

II.
BACKGROUND
Statutes of limitations ensure fairness and protect parties from
perpetual liability. 24 Congress realizes such statutes are necessary to pre16See

Carroll, supra note 4, at 186 (recognizing problems associated with Section

2462's inconsistent interpretation).
17See id (discussing Section 2462's inconsistent application); Holderer, supra note
4, at 1026 and accompanying text (acknowledging inconsistency).
18
See infra, notes 24-40 and accompanying text.
'9See infra, notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
20
See infra, notes 48-109 and accompanying text.
21See infra, notes 110-147 and accompanying text.
See infra, notes 110-147 and accompanying text.
See infra, notes 149 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (recognizing right to be free of stale claims); Order of R.R Telegraphers v. Railway Express
Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944) (acknowledging after passage of time, "evidence has
been lost, memories have faded and witnesses have disappeared"); 3M Co. v. Browner,
17 F.3d 1453, 1456 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting perpetual liability of claims contrary to our
judicial system).
2

2
2,
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vent the injustice of requiring a party to defend against an old claim
25
when memories have faded and witnesses are no longer available.
Statutes of limitations promote the theory that "the right to be free of
stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them." 26
The time-honored maxim that claims should not last into perpetuity
comes into conflict
when a party applies the statute of limitations against
27
the government.
Historically, the general rule provided that government enjoyed
sovereign immunity from the running of statutes of limitations. 28 Congress, however, held that an equitable judicial system requires protection
for citizens against stale claims initiated by the government. 29 Consistent
with this belief, courts found that an exception to the general rule exists
when Congress expressly imposes a limitations period upon government
entities. 30 In recognition of governmental immunity, however, courts
maintain that "statutes of limitations sought to be applied to bar the government's 3rights, must receive a strict construction in favor of the government." 1

2

See Order of R.R. Telegraphers, 321 U.S. at 348-49.
York Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. at 428.

26New

See Browner, 17 F.3d at 1456 (acknowledging statute of limitations do not run
against government unless Congress provides otherwise); Federal Election Comm'n v.
National Republican Senatorial Comm., 877 F. Supp. 15, 18 (D.D.C. 1995) (finding
tolling of Section 2462 proper only when administrative proceedings contain elements of
adversarial adjudication). "[Tlhe equitable need to eliminate older claims must be balanced against the general Supreme Court's competing requirement that statutes of limitations should be strictly construed in favor of the government." Id.
See Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132-33 (1938) (noting
United States exemption from operation of statutes of limitations). The Court reasoned
that because government actions are brought for the benefit of the public interest, they
should not be subject to statutes of limitations. Id.
29 See Carroll, supra note 1, at 186 (acknowledging necessity to apply statute of
limitations against government).
" See E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456, 462 (1924) (reasoning governmental actions not subject to time limitations unless otherwise granted by
Congress); United States v. Weintraub, 613 F.2d 612, 614 (6th Cir. 1979) (finding in
absence of specific Congressional authorization, statutes of limitations not applicable to
government); United States v. Tri-No Enter., Inc., 819 F.2d 154, 158 (7th Cir. 1987)
(holding where statute does not include limitations period, government may seek recovery at any time).
3'E.I Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 264 U.S. at 462. See also Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 398 (1984) (recognizing necessity for strict construction in
favor of government). But see Holderer, supra note 4, at 1027 (arguing interpretation of
Section 2462 in favor of government inconsistent with statutory objectives).
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The federal "catch all" statute of limitations has existed, in one
form or another, since originating from the Judiciary Act of 1799.32 Despite certain changes in language, the objective of the "catch all" statute
of limitation; to protect parties from inappropriate open ended penalties,
remains consistent. 33 Legislative history demonstrates Congress regarded time limitations on government
penalty claims to be essential to
34
an even-handed government.
Enacted in 1948, Section 2462 is essentially a rewriting of its
predecessor. 35 Nevertheless, certain language changes became the subject of debate between the courts.3 6 Specifically, the courts argue that the
1948 revision altered the legislative intent of the original "catch all" statute of limitations by including the word "enforcement." 37 The Reviser's
Notes on the rewriting of Section 2462 describes the alterations as
"changes in phraseology. 38 Consequently, an established canon of construction dictates that changes in phraseology do not change the original
statutory meaning. 39 Further, federal courts have debated whether Sec32See Browner, 17 F.3d at 1453-57 (outlining Section 2462's history); see also
Carroll, supra note 1, at 183 (explaining Section 2462's history).
"Judiciary Act of 1799, ch. 22, § 89 1 Stat. 695 (1799). See also S. Rep. No. 363
(1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1826, 1832 (revealing original statutory intent
endured with each amendment); Carroll, supra note 1, at 184 (outlining legislative history of Section 2462).
" See Holderer, supra note 4 (discussing legislative and Supreme Court pro-

nouncements requiring protection against stale claims for persons dealing with government).
ss See Browner, 17 F.3d at 1457 (outlining history of Section 2462 and recognizing
Section 791 as codified version of Revised Statutes § 1047, 18 Stat. 193 (1874)). The
1874 version of Section 2462 replaced a similar version contained in the Act of Feb. 28,
1839, Ch. 36, § 4, 5 stat. 321. Id. See also 28 U.S.C. § 791 (1911). Section 791 provides in pertinent part: "no suit or prosecution for any penalty or forfeiture, pecuniary or
otherwise, accruing under the laws of the United States, shall be maintained, except in
cases where it is specially provided, unless the same is commenced within five years
from the time when the penalty or forfeiture accrued..." Id.
See Browner, 17 F.3d at 1457 (acknowledging textual changes in statutory rewrite, 37
but noting no consequential changes to Section 2462).
See id. (noting addition of the word "enforcement"). Section 2462's predecessors provided that "no suit or prosecution for any penalty pecuniary or otherwise, accruing under the laws of the United States, shall be maintained... " Id. Alternatively,
Section 2462 provides: "except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit
or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty... " 28 U.S.C. § 2462
(1999).
See Browner, 17 F.3d at 1457 (outlining amendments made to section 2462).
" See id. (acknowledging change in phraseology does not change statute's original
meaning).
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tion 2462 should receive strict construction based on the plain language
of the statute or whether its interpretation should be based on a consideration of legislative intent and history.4°

III. HYPOTHETICAL FACT PATTERN
Consider a scenario involving a company in a closely regulated
business. A government agency regulates the particular business under a
congressionally enacted statute.4 1 This statute enables the agency to42impose civil penalties upon businesses that violate statutory provisions.
Suppose the company violated a statutory provision in 1990, and
the agency issued a notice of such violation in 1992. According to the
statute, after the notice of violation the company could either: (1) pay
the fine proposed, (2) make an informal response, or (3) request a formal
hearing. 43 Presume the company decided to make an informal

40See id. at 1455-57 (interpreting Section 2462 based on its legislative history).
The Browner court relied heavily on the legislative intent of the word "accrued" in determining that the accrual date is the date of the underlying violation. Id. Compare
United States v. Core Lab., Inc., 759 F.2d 480, 481-82 (5th Cir. 1985) (requiring statutory interpretation in light of its general legislative history), with United States v. Meyer,
808 F.2d 912, 914 (1st Cir. 1987) (finding plain language statutory interpretation requires date of final civil assessment be accrual date). The Meyer court refused to consider the statute's legislative history. Id. at 914. The Meyer court held that the statute
should be interpreted with the common meaning of its words where the language is unambiguous. See also Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (establishing "Congress intends words in its enactments to carry their ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning"); Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980) (holding that absent congressionally expressed intention, express language of
statute controls).
41See Holderer, supra note 4, at 1032 (employing TSCA as congressionally enacted statute and EPA as agency which regulates particular industry).
See id. (noting similarity of TSCA to other regulatory statutes in that it offers
multitude of sanctions).

" See 49 App U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812; 49 C.F.R. §§ 171-79 (outlining civil penalty
proceedings under Hazardous Materials Transportation Act ("HMTA")). The HMTA
will be used as a model statute for the purposes of the hypothetical penalty claim. Id. A
review of the HMTA regulations reveals that administrative proceedings begin service of
"notice of probable violation." Id. Within thirty days after service of the notice, the
party may either: (1) pay the proposed fine; (2) make an informal response; or (3) request
a formal hearing. Id. Failure of a party to respond to the notice of violation triggers the
agency's right to assess an appropriate civil penalty. Id. If an informal response option
is elected, then the party may submit material in support of its position and request a
conference. 49 App. U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812; 49 C.F.R. §§ 171-79. Following the confer-
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response. 44 Suppose then, the parties tentatively agreed upon a penalty in
1993, but the agency never issued a final civil penalty assessment.45
Then in 1997 the agency, realizing the company still owed the civil penalty, brought a judicial enforcement action in federal district court. The
company argues that Section 2462 bars the enforcement action because
the government brought it more than five years after the violation date.4
Alternatively, the government agency argues that the action is not time
barred because the enforcement
action is brought within five years of the
47
final penalty assessment.

IV. ANALYSIS
Presupposing Section 2462 applies to the hypothetical, it becomes
necessary to interpret the statutory meaning. 48 Most relevant is how
courts have interpreted the phrases "an action, suit or proceeding," and

ence the agency can either assess a penalty or dismiss the notice of probable violation.
Id. Nevertheless, a party retains the option to request a formal hearing if they do not
agree with the penalty assessed. Id.
"See 49 App U.S.C.§§ 1801-1812; 49 C.F.R.
charged with violation to make informal response).

§§ 171-79 (allowing company

See id. (allowing agency and violator to enter into negotiations).
"See United States v. Core Lab., Inc., 759 F.2d 480, 481 (5th Cir. 1985) (requiring within Section 2462 that government brings enforcement claims within five years of
violation).
7
4 See United States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 912, 921 (1st Cir. 1987) (finding date final
penalty assessment issued as accrual date).
"See Mullikin v. United States 952 F.2d. 920, 927 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding Congressional intent for precluding application of statute of limitations against 26 U.S.C.A.
67001). It is imperative that a consideration of the underlying statute reveal that Congress did not intend to apply another statute of limitations. Id. See also Capozzi v.
United States 980 F.2d 872, 873 (2nd Cir. 1992) (ruling for Section 2462 to apply, must
first consider if claim is for penalty recovery). The Capozzi court ruled Section 2462
does not apply to 26 U.S.C.A. § 6700 because the statute does not call for a penalty
action but rather a determination and recordation of the amount of taxes owed. Id. See
also Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Williams, 884 F. Supp. 28, 29 (D. Mass. 1995)
(finding Section 2462 not applicable to government claims for equitable relief).

§
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"the date when the claim first accrued., 49 Such interpretations are the
subject of much debate among the courts. 50
A consideration of three influential decisions is necessary to
achieve a clarification of Section 2462. 5' The Fifth Circuit Court in Core
and the First Circuit Court in Meyer provide examples of two conflicting
interpretations of when a claim first accrues under Section 2462.52 The
D.C. Circuit Court's decision in 3M Co. v. Browner,53 however, provides
a competent interpretation of the statute's scope as well as the framework
for applying the appropriate accrual date.54

A. A Considerationof the Core and Meyer Decisions
The Core court applied Section 2462 to a civil penalty dispute
arising under the Export Administration Act (EAA). 55 Based on legislative intent, previous case law, and practical considerations, that court56
held the five-year limitation period begins on the date of the violation.
Thus, under Core, a government agency must commence assessment
proceedings, as well as any enforcement action within five years of the
violation date.57

28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1994). The statute provides in pertinent part: "Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of
any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained
unless commenced within five years from the date when the claim first accrued... " Id.
4'

50See Carroll supra note l and accompanying text (acknowledging inconsistent interpretations of Section 2462); Holderer, supra note 4, and accompanying text (recognizing inconsistent holdings of Core and Meyer).
"'See Holderer, supra note 4, at 1027 (recognizing Core, Meyer and 3M Co. as instrumental decisions).
52 United States v. Core Lab., Inc., 759 F.2d 480, 490 (5th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 912, 920 (1st Cir. 1987).
17 F.3d 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
" See id. at 1455-62 (defining Section 2462's scope and finding accrual date is
date of underlying violation).
'3

soCore Lab., Inc., 759 F.2d at 480-81.
5'

See id. at 481-83 (rejecting holding in Unites States Dep't of Labor v. Old Ben
Coal Co., 676 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1982)). The court found the date of the underlying
violation is the proper accrual date. Id. The court held the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Old Ben is unconvincing because it did not recognize the abundance of case law applying
pre-Section 2462 statutes. Id.
57 See Core Lab., Inc., 759 F.2d. at
482-83.
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In Core, the defendant violated the EAA in 1978.58 The Commerce Department subsequently charged the defendant for such violations, and administrative proceedings ensued in 1979. 59 In 1983, the
government imposed an $81,300.00 civil penalty. 6° Following the defendant's refusal to pay the penalty, the government initiated a judicial
enforcement proceeding in 1984.61 Core defended the action by asserting
that Section 2462 barred the judicial enforcement action .62 The government argued that an enforcement action does not accrue until the completion of an administrative assessment proceeding and the issuance of a
final assessment.6 3
In finding the limitations period begins to run on the date of the
underlying violation, the Core court relied on earlier decisions applying
statutes that preceded Section 2462. 64 The court noted that Section
2462's predecessor statutes produced a considerable number of decisions
accepting the violation date as the proper accrual date. 65 The court applied these decisions with the statute's underlying legislative intent and
practical considerations to support its holding.66 The court noted that the
"progress of administrative proceedings is largely within the control of
the government" and that "a limitation period that began to run only after
the government concluded its administrative proceedings would thus
"Id.
Id. at 481.
GoId.
a Id.
62 Core Lab.,

Inc., 759 F.2d at 481.

-Id.

"See id. (refusing to consider other statutes when considerable case law applies
Section 2462 or its predecessors).
" See id. (citing United States v. Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 982 n. 1 (3rd
Cir. 1984)); Western Pac. Fisheries, Inc. v. S.S. President Grant, 730 F.2d 1280, 1287
(9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Witherspoon, 211 F.2d 858, 861 (6th Cir. 1954); Lancashire Shipping Co. v Durning, 98 F.2d 751, 753 (2nd Cir. 1938).
"6See Core Lab. Inc., 759 F.2d at 483 (referring to certain legislative history regarding amendment to EAA to support its decision); H.R. Rep. No. 434, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 5, (1965). The House report provides in pertinent part:
The bill does not prescribe any period following an offense within which
the civil penalty must be imposed. It is intended that the general five year
limitation imposed by Section 2462 of Title 28 shall govern. Under this
Section, the time is reckoned for the commission of the act giving rise to
the liability, and not from the time of imposition of the penalty, and it is
applicable to administrative as well as judicial proceedings.
H. Rep. No. 434, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, (1965) (emphasis added). Such legislative
history, of course, would only be applicable to an action under the EAA. Id.
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amount in practice to little or none. ' 67 In rejecting the government's argument that the administrative proceedings toll the limitations period, the
court reasoned that the tolling contradicts the general purpose of a statute
of limitations: a citizen's right to be free of stale claims.6 8
Meyer, decided more than two years after Core, specifically rejected the reasoning proposed in Core.69 The First Circuit Court in
Meyer found the accrual date to be the date the government issued a final
civil penalty assessment.70 The court essentially ruled that although administrative proceedings must be initiated within five years of the violation date, Section 2462 provides an additional five years after the proceedings to bring a judicial enforcement action. 71 Under this interpretadoes not begin
tion, the statute of limitations for an "enforcement" action
72
penalty.
civil
final
its
assesses
agency
an
until
to run

67Core Lab. Inc., 759

F.2d at 482. See also Federal Election Comm'n v. Nat'l

Republican Senatorial Comm., 877 F. Supp. 15, 20 (D.D.C. 1995) (finding date of violations as proper accrual date). The FederalElection Commission court reasoned if the
accrual date is the date on which administrative proceedings conclude it would encourage government to drag out its proceedings, thus obstructing the general purpose against
open-ended penalties. Id. at 19. See also United States v. Graham, No. 87-1843, 1989
WL 248111 * 3 (W.D. Pa. July 20, 1989) (following Core reasoning). The Graham
court held that penalty proceedings should be brought within five years of the original
notice of violation because they are largely within the government's control. Id. Further,
in Graham, the statute from which the penalty claim arose did not require assessment
proceedings as a prerequisite to a judicial enforcement action. Id. See infra, notes 13144 and accompanying text (discussing tolling of statute of limitations when administrative assessment proceeding prerequisite to enforcement action).
See Core Lab. Inc., 759 F.2d at 482-83 (reasoning legislative intent to protect
citizens from stale claims supersedes government's right to prosecute). The court found
no authority in support of the government's argument that the statute is tolled during the
administrative proceedings. Id. The court did note, however, that it might be able to use
its equity powers to toll the statute of limitations if, for example, the defendant's "dilatory tactics" caused the untimeliness of the government's lawsuit. Id.
'9 CompareUnited States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 912, 913 (1st Cir. 1987) (rejecting
Core decision) with Core Lab., Inc., 759 F.2d at 480 (rendering decision in 1985).
70 See Meyer, 808 F.2d at 918.
7'See id. at 913-20. The court interpreted Section 2462 as requiring the government to bring administrative penalty actions within five years of the violation date. Id. at
913. See also Lancashire Shipping Co. v. Durning, 98 F.2d 751, 753 (2nd Cir. 1938)
(interpreting Section 2462's predecessor, 28 U.S.C. § 791, as being satisfied upon commencement of administrative proceeding).
72See Meyer, 808 F.2d at 910 (finding five-year limitations period for administrative proceedings followed by five years for enforcement actions).
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In Meyer, the EAA violations occurred in 1978, while administrative proceedings were not initiated until 19 8 1.73 As part of the proceedings, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) presided over the hearings
on the matter.74 Upon the culmination of the hearings in 1983, the ALJ
imposed a civil penalty for the violations. 75 The respondent unsuccessfully protested the decision, and the court affirmed the penalty in 1984.76
By December 31, 1985, the respondent had not paid the penalty,
prompting the government to initiate a judicial enforcement action more
than five years after the infractions occurred.77

In interpreting Section 2462, the Meyer court emphasized the
EAA's requirement of mandatory administrative proceedings prior to
bringing a judicial enforcement action, a fact not addressed by the court
in Core.78 The Meyer court recognized that the EAA effectively prohibited a judicial enforcement action until the government assessed a civil
penalty that the respondent failed to pay. 79 The court found the EAA
73

id.

71Id.

The inclusion of an ALI in administrative proceedings evidence the adjudicatory nature of the proceedings required by the EAA. Id.
76
Id. at 913.
76 Id. The court distinguished adjudicatory administrative proceedings from
"prosecutorial determinations." Id.
7 See Meyer, 808 F.2d at 913 (recognizing administrative proceedings
as condition
precedent to bringing judicial enforcement action under EAA).
78 See id. at 914 (recognizing EAA requires administrative proceedings before imposition of penalty). The court held that a penalty cannot be "enforced" as defined by
Section 2462 until the penalty comes into existence. Id. The court further reasoned that
a penalty assessed under the EAA does not come into existence until the administrative
proceedings are completed. Id. See also Lins v. United States, 688 F.2d 784, 786 (Ct.
Cl. 1982) (recognizing suits subject to mandatory administrative proceedings do not
accrue until proceedings conclude). But see United States v. Core Lab. Inc., 759 F.2d
480, 481-83 (5th Cir. 1985) (neglecting EAA requirement of administrative proceedings
in analysis). The Meyer court refused to follow the cases relied upon in the Core decision. See Meyer, 808 F.2d at 914 (noting parties in cases used in Core decision could
bring enforcement actions without initially seeking administrative remedies).
79 See Meyer, 808 F.2d at 914. The court recognized that EAA language restricts
the introduction of a civil suit "until the appropriate administrative authority has imposed
a sanction which the respondent has thereafter refused to satisfy." Id. "In the event of
the failure of any person to pay a penalty imposed pursuant to the anti-boycott provisions
of the EAA, a civil action for the recovery thereof may... be brought in the name of the
United States." 50 U.S.C. App. § 2410(f). See also United States Dep't. of Labor v. Old
Ben Coal Co., 676 F2d 259, 265 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding claim accrues after administrative proceeding ends and respondent fails to pay penalty). But see Unexcelled Chem.
Corp. v. United States, 345 U.S. 59, 66(1953) (finding enforcement action accrued at
moment of violation).
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requirements consistent with its interpretations of Section 2462.80 The
court read the accrual language in Section 2462 to propose that a claim
accrues only when a suit can be maintained. 8' Thus, the court reasoned,
when applying Section 2462 to the EAA, that an agency cannot maintain
an enforcement claim until there is a penalty to enforce (after assessment
proceedings) and the respondent refuses to pay.82
The Meyer court deduced that if it adopted the Core rationale the
statute of limitations for the enforcement of a civil penalty could run
before the government even had the right to initiate such a suit. 83 The
court considered this unreasonable in light of its view that administrative
proceedings were largely beyond the government's control, a point directly in conflict with Core.84 The Meyer court also noted that a party
charged with violating the EAA enjoyed the right to a "full panoply of
discovery devices" as well as the right to an appeal.85 The Meyer court
found it unreasonable to require an administrative agency to discover a
80See Meyer, 808 F.2d at 914.
81See id. at 913 (defining "date when claim first accrued" as date when suit may
be maintained). The Meyer court reasoned, within the context of its interpretation of
Section 2462, that an "enforcement" action could not accrue until there was a penalty to
enforce. Id. The court interpreted the "enforcement action" to mean an action brought to
compel a penalty already in existence. Id. But see 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453,
1457 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (interpreting "enforcement action" to mean action imposing penalty). Unlike the Core decision, the decision in Meyer did not rely on the legislative
intent of the Section 2462 or its predecessors. Meyer, 808 F.2d at 914. The Meyer court
elected to base its decision on a plain language interpretation and supporting case law.
Id. The Meyer court reasoned, "where the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous,
courts should be extremely hesitant to search for ways to interpose their own notions of
Congress's intent." Id. The court held that Section 2462 is open to one reasonable interpretation and thus, reliance on Congressional materials is improper. Id.
82 See Meyer, 808 F.2d at 913 (reiterating enforcement action cannot "accrue" until
after issuance of penalty following assessment proceedings).
' See id. at 918-19. The court reasoned that, in the absence of explicit Congressional intent to the contrary, the deduction that a statute of limitations could render an
enforcement suit voidable before it has accrued is unreasonable. Id. The court followed
the maxim that "legislation should be interpreted to avoid ... unreasonable results
whenever possible." Id.
" See id. at 912. The court noted that after an agency issues a charging letter, the
prerequisites of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) control, and the timing of the
case is beyond the management of the agency. Id. But see United States v. Core Lab.,
Inc., 759 F.2d 480, 483 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding administrative proceedings largely
within government's control).
See Meyer, 808 F.2d at 919. The court found, within the context of the EAA,
that administrative proceedings were similar to judicial adjudications, complete with
interrogatories, depositions, subpoenas and other protections implemented by the APA.
Id.

2000]

FEDERAL "CATCH ALL" STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

6S

violation, conduct an investigation, issue a notice of violation, and then
proceed through an often lengthy administrative proceeding and subsequent appeal within a five year period.86
The Meyer court relied upon the Supreme Court's holding in
Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States87 in reaching its decision. 88
Similar to a suit brought under the EAA, the statute in Crown Coat required an exhaustion of all administrative remedies prior to bringing a
judicial enforcement action.8 9 The Supreme Court held in Crown Coat,
within the context of 28 U.S.C. § 2401, a right to bring a civil action
matures only after the mandatory administrative decision is issued. 9°

B. Issue revisited by the Browner Court
The decision in Browner renders intelligible the conflicting interpretations of Section 2462, yet does not signify a clear explanation of the
statutory application. 91 Specifically, the Browner court established that
under Section 2462, an "action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of
a civil fine" included administrative proceedings. 92 The court also interSee id.

8'386 U.S. 503 (1967).
Meyer, 808 F.2d at 916. In Crown Coat, a private party brought an action under
28 U.S.C. § 2401 to adjust a government contract. Crown Coat Front Co., 386 U.S. 50405. The plaintiff in Crown Coat brought the action more than six years after the occurrence of the underlying events of his claim but less than six years after the administrative
decision of his claim. Id. at 511-14.
Crown Coat Front Co., 386 U.S. at 512-14.
See id. (finding, under Section 2401, "right of action" does not exist until completion of administrative proceedings). But see Unexcelled Chem. Corp. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 59, 64 (1953) (finding two year statute of limitations runs from violation
date). The Unexcelled court held, within the context of the Walsh Healey Act, that a
limitations period begins when the violation occurs. Id. But see Meyer, 808 F.2d at 916
(distinguishing Unexcelled decision). The Meyer court distinguished the ruling in Unexcelled on the basis that, unlike suits brought under the EAA, the government in Unexcelled, could file a judicial action at any time with or without prior administrative proceedings. Id.
91See 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1457 (D.C. Cir 1994) (recognizing no
clear interpretation of Section 2462's accrual date or applicability to administrative proceedings). The Brownerdecision held that the proper accrual date is the date of the
underlying violation. Id. The court however, did not explain Section 2462's application
in cases where administrative proceedings are a prerequisite to enforcement proceedings.
Id.
, See id. at 1455 (quoting language of Title 28 U.S.C. § 2462).
90
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preted the accrual date as the date of the underlying violation. 93 The
Browner court, however, mitigated the latter finding when applied to
collection proceedings that follow administrative liability proceedings
and do not question the validity of the penalty imposed, but rather only
seek to enforce the penalty. 94
In Browner, the court applied Section 2462 to a penalty action
brought under 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)(A). 95 The defendant committed
several violations of the Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA) between
1980 and 1986. 96 Under Section 2615(a)(2)(A), the TSCA requires the
government to assess civil penalties for violations of the statute only
after the completion of a hearing on the violations. 97 The TSCA, however, contains no provision limiting the time within which the government must bring an administrative action. 98 3M argued that the government's claim was time barred because Section 2462 applied to administrative proceedings brought under the TSCA. 99 The ALJ presiding over
the proceedings and subsequent appeal rejected 3M's argument and ruled
Section 2462 does not apply to administrative assessment proceedings. 1
In repudiating the ALJ decision, the Browner court identified no
substantial distinction between an agency's assessment adjudication and
the judicial process.'0 ' The court found agency proceedings to be analo93
See id. at 1460 (acknowledging that Title 15 U.S.C. § 2615 (a)(2)(A) does not
require administrative assessment proceedings).

See id. at 1458 n.8 (noting some courts have extended statute of limitations extra
five years). The Browner court recognized that courts have granted an extra five years
for collection proceedings where administrative assessment proceedings are prerequisites
to a judicial action. Id. The Browner court merely notes certain decisions in which
enforcement proceedings were given an extra five years after the assessment proceedings
have concluded, it did not follow in these decisions nor explain their interpretations. Id
at 1458-59. See also United States v. Noble Oil Co., 1988 U.S. Dist. Lexis 11526, *5,
1988 WL 109727, * 2 (D.N.J.) (distinguishing judicial enforcement actions from administrative assessment proceedings). The Noble court held that enforcement actions are
entirely separate proceedings because they are brought by the Attorney General and do
not review or question the validity of the penalty imposed. Id.
See Browner, 17 F.3d at 1453-55 (referring to Toxic Substance Control Act).
SId.
97

at 1455.

id.
Ild.
Ild.

'®Browner, 17 F.3d at 1455.
'0'See id. at 1455-57 (finding that civil penalties assessment proceedings brought
under TSCA model judicial proceedings). One should note that the Browner court found
only the administrative proceedings of the EPA within the context of the TSCA to be
similar to judicial proceedings. Id. See also United States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 912, 920
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gous to the judicial process in that complaints are brought, motions are
answered, depositions are taken, discovery pursued, and a hearing is held
where evidence is introduced before an impartial trier of fact."12 The
court acknowledged that the administrative proceedings leading to the
imposition of a civil penalty mitigate the concern that "after the passage
of time evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared."'10 3 The court further noted that assessment proceedings
under TSCA seek to impose civil penalties and are thus proceedings for
the "enforcement" of penalties consistent with Section 2 46 2 .104
The Browner court rejected the "discovery of violation" argument
in ruling the accrual date under Section 2462 is the date of the underlying
violation. 0 5 In making its determinations, the court considered predecessor statutes to Section 2462 and legislative intent.1 6 The court noted
(IstCir. 1987) (distinguishing administrative proceedings from prosecutorial determinations). See Holderer, supra note 4, at 1025 (discussing Congressional committee reports
indicating Section 2462 applies to administrative proceedings). The indirect history of
Section 2462 indicates that Congress intended the five year limitations period be applicable to assessment proceedings. Id.
102 See Browner, 17 F.3d at 1456 (referring to aspects of administrative assessment
process under TSCA). The Browner court noted that the APA recognizes the administrative assessment process as a "proceedings." Id. at 1457.
'03See id.
at 1457 (quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphersv. Railway Express Agency,
321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)).

',See id. at 1457 (rejecting EPA's argument). The EPA argued Section 2462
should be interpreted so that "enforcement" refers to collection actions for penalties
already imposed and not for administrative assessment actions. Id. In rejecting the argument, the court held that if the EPA's argument were accepted, a party would not be
protected against stale claims. Id. The court also noted that the term enforcement was
added to the statute as part of the 1948 legislative revision that was not intended to affect
the substance of the act. Id. But see Meyer, 808 F.2d at 914-21 (finding an "enforcement action" refers to claims to compel civil penalties already in existence).
,05
See Browner, 17 F.3d at 1460 (rejecting argument that because of difficulties in
discovering violations accrual date should be discovery date). The court declined the
"discovery of violation" argument because a penalty claim had nothing to do with a
latent injury, the basis of the discovery rule. Id. The court noted the action was a penalty action, and liability attaches at the moment of the violation, thus the moment of the
violation should be the time when the claim "first accrued." Id. See also Unexcelled
Chem. Corp. v. United States, 345 U.S. 59, 61 (1953) (rejecting "discovery of violation"
rule and holding enforcement claim accrues on date of violation); Johnson v. Securities
and Exchange Comm'n., 87 F.3d 484, 486 (U.S. App. D.C. 1996) (acknowledging Section 2462 application to assessment proceedings).
'06
See Browner, 17 F.3d at 1460. The court established that an interpretation of pre
Section 2462 statutes is relevant because subsequent amendments to such statutes were
merely changes in phraseology that did not change the original statutory purpose. Id. at
1458.
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that Congress did not intend the word "accrued" to mean the date that the
violation was discovered when it first used the word in the 1839 version
of Section 2462.107 The court acknowledged that history has consistently
interpreted the word "accrued" as intending that the limitations period be
measured from the actual violation date.108 Despite finding the violation
date as the appropriate accrual date, the court noted that in situations
where administrative assessment proceedings are a prerequisite to a judicial enforcement action, other courts have interpreted the date of the final
assessment as the proper accrual date.1°9

V. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE PROPER
APPLICATION OF SECTION 2462
Notwithstanding their inconsistent holdings, the Browner, Meyer,
and Core decisions provide the foundation for the proper application of
Section 2462 to civil penalty cases." 0 More recent courts have applied
these decisions to penalty claims brought under a myriad of statutes and
achieved equitable results."' The decisions often tend to be inconsistent
when applied between differing statutes.12 To correctly determine if

See id. at 1462 (noting discovery rule not used in 1839).
'o8 See id. (explaining holdings of cases applying predecessor statutes of Section
2462).
109

See id. at 1458, n.8 citing Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 386 U.S. 503,

512 (1967); United States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 912, 914 (1st Cir. 1987); United States
Dep't. of Labor v. Old Ben Coal Co., 676 F.2d 259, 261 (7th Cir. 1982). The Browner
court only made reference to the cited cases and did not follow or explain their decisions.
Id. The above cited cases recognize that where administrative proceedings are a prerequisite to a judicial action the claim does not accrue until the final penalty is imposed.
Old Ben Coal Co., 676 F.2d at 261; Crown Coat FrontCo., 386 U.S. at 503; Meyer, 808
F.2d at 912.
110Compare Browner, 17 F.3d at 1461, with United States v. Core Lab., Inc., 759
F.2d 480, 487 (5th Cir. 1985) and Meyer 808 F.2d at 915. See also supra notes 55-109
(analyzing Core, Meyer and Browner decisions).
...
See e.g., United States v. Great Am. Veal, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 416, 42021(D.N.J. 1998) (holding limitations period begins after issuance of administrative decision where assessment proceedings are prerequisite); Federal Election Comm'n. v. National Republican Senatorial Comm., 877 F. Supp. 15, 18 (D.D.C. 1995) (finding enforcement claim time barred because administrative process did not amount to adjudication); United States v. Lueking, 125 B.R. 513, 515 (E.D.Tenn. 1990) (holding limitations
period begins on violation date unless administrative proceedings are prerequisite).
1 2
1 See Great Am. Veal, Inc., 998 F. Supp. at 422 (holding
that limitations period
begins to run upon culmination of assessment proceedings). But see NationalRepubli-
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Section 2462 precludes the hypothetical penalty claim, it is necessary to
consider both
the statute under which it is brought, as well as relevant
3
law."
case

A. Hypothetical Statute's Administrative Processcould be regardedas
"proceedings."
Presupposing that the hypothetical statute proposed in the previously referenced fact pattern does not contain an express limitations period or Congressional intent that no limitations period should apply, a
consideration of whether the administrative proceedings under the statute
are consistent with Section 2462 is relevant."l 4 In one form or another,
the hypothetical statute requires an agency to conduct an assessment ad-5
judication before it initiates a judicial enforcement proceeding."
Whether the type of adjudication chosen is a "proceeding" 6or merely a
"prosecutorial determination," however, requires resolution."
can SenatorialComm., 877 F. Supp. at 20 (finding date of underlying violation as appro-

priate accrual date).
113
See Mullikin v. United States 952 F.2d 920, 927 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding Congressional intent for precluding application of Section 2462 against 26 U.S.C.A. §
67001). Section 2462 includes qualifying language, "except as otherwise provided by
act of Congress" which precludes its application where congressional intent is found. Id.
at 929. It is imperative that a consideration of the underlying statute reveal that Congress did not intend to apply another statute of limitations. Id. See also Capozzi v.
United States 980 F.2d 872, 873 (2nd Cir. 1992) (ruling for Section 2462 to apply must
first consider if claim is for penalty recovery). Congressional intent for another statute
of limitations to apply to particular statute precludes Section 2462. Capozzi, 980 F.2d at
873. If the statute under which the claim is brought requires administrative proceedings
prior to enforcement action, case law indicates the accrual date is different than when no
proceedings are required. Compare Old Ben Coal Co., 676 F.2d at 261 (ruling collection
action for penalty previously imposed administratively accrues after administrative assessment proceeding has ended) with Lueking, 125 B.R. at 515 (holding violation date is
proper accrual date unless administrative assessment proceedings are prerequisite).
114 See 49 App. U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812; 49 C.F.R. §§ 171-79 (outlining civil penalty
proceedings under Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA)). The hypothetical
fact pattern is modeled after the HMTA. Section 2462 is applicable under an HMTA
enforcement claim. Id.
'" See id. (describing procedure under HMTA model used for hypothetical statute). The hypothetical administrative procedure requires a party to either (1) pay the fine
proposed, (2) make an informal response, or (3) request a formal hearing. Id.
"G See 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (defining requirements for administrative adjudication to be "proceedings" within language of Section 2462).
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Relying on the analysis proposed in Browner, an administrative
assessment process is categorized as a "proceeding" if the process is an
"adversarial adjudication. ' 17 Specifically, administrative measures are
"proceedings" when they consists of a hearing before an impartial trier of
fact, complete with the introduction of evidence, the questioning of witnesses and the determination of ultimate liability." 8 An enforcement
action, subsequent to this type of administrative adjudication, would not
question the validity of the penalty imposed." 9 This type of adjudication
ensures the satisfaction of the statute of limitation's objectives. 20 A simple test is whether the adjudication
ensures fairness for the party and
12 1
promotes judicial efficiency.
Alternatively, "prosecutorial determinations" constitute nothing
more than decisions to bring a civil penalty suit.1 22 In such instances
there is no forum to "adjudicate liability." 123 Mere determinations to
impose a civil penalty do not contain the elements of a judicial proceeding that ensures fairness to the defending party. 24
In the hypothetical penalty case, the company chose to make an
informal response. 125 The company had an opportunity to question the
117
18

See id. (describing elements of valid proceeding).
See id. at 1459 n. 11 (recognizing term "proceeding" implies some type of ad-

versarial adjudication). Compare Capozzi, 980 F.2d at 873 (finding IRS assessment of
penalty is an ex parte act not adversarial adjudication) with Browner, 17 F.3d at 1458
(holding administrative assessment proceedings under TSCA are adversarial adjudications).
19 See Browner, 17 F.3d at 1458 (recognizing subsequent action as "collection action").
120 See id. at 1456 (finding objectives of statutes of limitations
apply equally to
administrative and judicial proceedings).
1.1 See Holderer, supra note 4, at 1026-27 (outlining statute of limitation's objectives to include fairness to parties and promoting judicial efficacy).
12

2 See United States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 912, 919-20 (describing "prosecutorial
determinations" as non-adjudicative). The Meyer court recognized that "prosecutorial
determinations" fall entirely within the control of the government, whereas adjudicatory
administrative proceedings are outside the government's control. Id.
3
12 See id. (noting under prosecutorial determination party has no
right to adjudicate

liability)
124See id. (recognizing prosecutorial determinations as mere decision to impose a
civil penalty); Browner, 17 F.3d at 1457-59 (describing elements of administrative proceeding).
12See 49 App. U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812; 49 C.F.R. §§ 171-79 (allowing company
charged with violation to make informal response). Under HMTA (model for hypothetical) defendant company can either: (1) pay the fine imposed; (2) make an informal response; (3) request a formal hearing. Id.
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validity of the agency's allegations but chose to provide materials to the
agency in hopes of negotiating a settlement. 126 If the informal negotiations culminated with the agency assessing an agreed upon penalty, one
could argue that the company in effect waived its right to a formal adjudication.' 27 Despite the fact that an informal negotiation does not resemble an "adversarial adjudication," the process did achieve the statutory
objectives: fairness
was attained, and the efficiency of the judicial sys28
promoted.
tem
In the hypothetical fact pattern, however, the parties agreed to a
tentative penalty, and the agency never issued a final penalty. Therefore,
after the completion of the informal negotiations, the company never had
the opportunity to request a formal hearing because the agency never
issued its final assessment. The informal negotiations were merely preliminary discussions which, if not to the company's liking, were to be
followed by an administrative hearing adjudicating liability. In effect,
the company could argue that by not issuing the final penalty assessment,
the agency wielded a threat of an open-ended penalty. 2 9 Consistent with
this argument, the company could assert that the negotiation process was
largely within the government's control and that the delay in issuing the
final penalty assessment is inequitable. 3 °

'6See id. Under HMTA (model for hypothetical), one could argue that a defendant party waived there right to formal hearing by choosing informal response option.
Id.
127

See id.

'"See Burnett v. New York Central R.R. Co. 380 U.S. 424, 428 (describing general objectives of statute of limitations).
'2 See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Republican Senatorial Comm. 877 F.
Supp. 15, 18 (D.D.C. 1995) (acknowledging that preventing government from yielding
open ended penalties is statute of limitations objective). It could be argued, consistent
with the Core decision that the administrative proceedings were within the control of the
agency. United States v. Core Lab., Inc., 759 F.2d 480, 483 (5th Cir. 1985)(holding that
accrual date is date of violation because proceedings are within government's control).
130 See United States v. Graham, 1989 WL 248111 *4 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (finding

proceedings are within government's control and should be brought within notice of
violation). In essence, the agency waited four years after the culmination of the informal
negotiations to assess its final penalty. Id.
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B. Administrative Proceedingsand JudicialEnforcement Actions are
Two Separate Claims in Regards to Section 2462.
The informal response option chosen by the company in the hypothetical cannot be regarded as a "proceeding" consistent with the language of Section 2462.131 Thus, the five year limitation period in the
hypothetical began on the date of the underlying violation. 132 In the hypothetical, initiation of the administrative process began within five
years of the date of the violations.133 The judicial enforcement action,
however, was initiated six years after the violations occurred. 134 In this
hypothetical fact pattern there was no adjudication, either administrative
or judicial, which determined liability.' 35 The basic rule taken from rele-

's' See 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting that "proceedings" must include adversarial adjudication). Where administrative assessment
adjudication is not a prerequisite to a judicial enforcement action the date of the underlying violation is the proper accrual date. See id. (recognizing Section 2462 objectives
are not satisfied without assessment adjudication). If the company had chosen a formal
hearing, and the hearing included an adversarial adjudication of liability, then one could
argue the accrual date for the enforcement claim is the date the final penalty was assessed. See Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 386 U.S. 503, 508 (1967) (ruling
that statute of limitations applies to both administrative assessment proceeding and subsequent enforcement claim). A statute of limitations very similar to Section 2462 was
applied in Crown Coat. Id. The Crown Coat Court ruled that administrative proceedings
that include a determination of liability do not preclude the statute of limitations from
applying to subsequent collection claims. Id.
32
1 See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text (outlining
hypothetical fact pat-

tern).
' See supra, notes 42-47 and accompanying text (describing the hypothetical fact
pattern).
134 See supra, notes 42-47 and accompanying text (describing
hypothetical fact
pattern).
.3 See supra note 42-47 and accompanying text (describing hypothetical fact pattern); Browner, 17 F.3d at 1457-59 (establishing that "proceeding" within context of
Section 2462 requires adversarial adjudication and determination of liability). In regards
to the hypothetical, the government agency could theorize that by choosing the informal
response in hopes of negotiating a settlement, the company accepted liability and waived
its right to an adjudication that determines liability. The agency could further argue that
the company understood the penalty imposed and simply failed to pay it. Conversely,
the defendant company could rebut that despite the informal negotiations the company
had no way of knowing the specific penalty imposed until the final assessment was issued. Further, by failing to impose the final penalty the agency neglected the companies
right to a hearing.
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vant case law seems to be that an adjudication determining
liability must
36
date.
violation
the
of
years
five
within
be commenced
Where the adjudication is adversarial and is a prerequisite to a judicial enforcement action, an additional five years should be afforded to
the latter claim. 37 In such a situation, the two proceedings should be
regarded as entirely separate claims. 38 An enforcement action that follows an administrative adjudication is merely an action to collect a penalty already imposed.13 9 The Attorney General brings enforcement actions, not the government agency that imposes the penalty. 4° In such
actions, courts will not question the validity of the penalty (no de novo
review).,14 Therefore, there is no need for memories to be fresh or witnesses to be available. The fairness considerations of the statutes of
limitation have been satisfied through the formalities of the antecedent
administrative proceeding. 142

'" See e.g. United States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 912, 913 (1st Cir. 1987) (recognizing
"any administrative action aimed at imposing civil penalty must be brought within five
years of alleged violation"); Browner, 17 F.3d at 1455-58 (asserting administrative adjudications are "proceedings" that must be brought within five years of violation date);
United States v. Great Am. Veal, Inc., 998 F. Supp. at 422-25 (finding judicial enforcement actions receive additional five years where administrative assessment proceedings
come first); supra note 115-124 and accompanying text (discussing tolling of statute of
limitations where administrative proceedings are adjudicatory).
37
1 See Crown Coat Front Co., 386 U.S. at 503 (applying statue of limitations
to
both assessment claim and subsequent collection claim); Meyer, 808 F.2d at 916-21
(holding accrual date is date of final assessment because of administrative proceedings);
Federal Election Comm'n v. National Republican Senatorial Comm., 877 F. Supp. 15, 20
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding Section 2462 tolls limitation period only when administrative
proceedings constitute adversarial adjudication).
'38See Meyer, 808 F.2d at 916-21 (finding Section 2462 applicable to both administrative proceedings that determine liability and subsequent enforcement actions);
United States v. Noble Oil Co. 1988 WL 109727, *2 (D.N.J. 1988) (finding administrative and judicial penalty actions are two separate proceedings)
39
' See Crown Coat Front Co., 386 U.S. at 503-12; Meyer, 808 F.2d at 916-2
(holding no enforcement actions until penalty assessment).

"0See Noble Oil Co., 1988 WL 109727, *2. (noting under TSCA, assessment and
collection proceedings are separate, with Attorney General initiating collection action).
. See id. (noting in collection action, "validity, amount and appropriateness" of
penalty is not reviewed).
142See Holderer, supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing statute of limitation objectives); Burnett v. New York Central R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (acknowledging right to be free of stale claims); Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway
Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944) (recognizing need to preserve witnesses,
evidence and memories).
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Where, however, the administrative process does not include the
common elements of an adversarial adjudication, the judicial action must
be brought within five years of the violation date. 143 Administrative assessment procedures that effectuate nothing more than "prosecutorial
determinations" do not satisfy the statute of limitation's objectives. 44 In
such a situation any lengthy delay caused by the agency would be detrimental to the fair resolution of a controversy. 4 5 This is evident in the
hypothetical penalty claim. 146 By the time the agency issued its final
assessment, four years passed since the culmination of the negotiations
and six years passed since the actual violations.147 Therefore, if the company had opted for a hearing consistent with statute, there would have
been faded memories and lost witnesses.'" The agency in this situation
has only its own indecision to blame.
VI. CONCLUSION
Based upon the ambiguity surrounding Section 2462, a clarification of its application to civil penalty cases is needed. 49 In an age where
government regulation plays an increasingly important role in society it
is essential to the maintenance of an equitable judicial system that Section 2462 have a clear and unambiguous role. It is unjust for the government to use a body of inconsistent federal case law as a tool for
keeping penalty claims actionable in perpetuity. Conversely, it is also
unjust for a party to violate a statute, have a penalty imposed, refuse to

" See 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1458-62 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding violation date as proper accrual date). The Browner court did note that courts have given an
additional five years to claims brought under statutes which require assessment proceedings as prerequisites to enforcement actions. Id.
'" See Meyer 808 F.2d at 920 (distinguishing "prosecurotial determinations" from

administrative proceedings).
'*See Holderer, supra note 4 (discussing statute of limitation objectives and legislative intent for equitable judicial system).
'" See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text (outlining hypothetical fact pattern).
47

' See

supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text (outlining hypothetical fact pat-

tern). t
See Holderer, supra note 4 (acknowledging
statute of limitation objectives).
149

See Carroll, supra note 1 and accompanying text (recognizing inconsistent ap-

plication of section 2462).
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pay that penalty, and then avoid satisfying the penalty on a technicality
such as Section 2462.
In summary, application of Section 2462 to a penalty claim would
be intensely fact specific. It would require an in-depth analysis into the
administrative procedures of the particular statute under which the claim
is brought. If the statute requires administrative assessment adjudication
as a prerequisite to a judicial enforcement action, it is necessary to determine whether the adjudication is a "proceeding" within the definition
of Section 2462. If the adjudication is a "proceeding" as defined by Section 2462, then the government should be afforded five years from the
date of the violation to commence the required administrative assessment
proceeding. In such a situation, the agency would also have an additional five years to bring a judicial enforcement action. Where, however,
the administrative process entails mere "prosecutorial determinations,"
an agency must bring a judicial enforcement action within five years of
the violation date.
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